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STATE LAW AND THE DAMAGES REMEDY
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
SOME PROBLEMS IN FEDERALISM
By JOSEPH A. PAGE*
The remedial reach of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act has
been extended to tortious conduct violative of an individual's civil
rights, such conduct also being actionable under state law. Professor
Page examines this area of overlap of federal and state civil remedies
and the challenge to federalism thus presented. He points out the
problem of collateral estoppel which arises if separate suits are
brought respectively in state and federal courts. Joinder of both
claims in a single form, preferably federal, is thus desirable. Pro-
fessor Page analyzes the issues which a federal court must resolve
to award any monetary damages for the constitutional tort and the
common law tort. Should the court invoke a federal common law or
should it borrow state law? Should actions under section 1983 sur-
vive? Should there be wrongful death recoveries, and if so, any
limitations on recovery? Professor Page then points out the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a "selective use" of state law, i.e., federal
and state law is utilized but the court may substitute federal law for
state law when desirable. He concludes that a federal damages rem-
edy can give the injured party a better recovery and in so doing,
need not pose any imminent threat to federalism.
N Monroe v. Pape,' the United States Supreme Court expanded
the scope of the damages remedy created by Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act Until Screws v. United States,' the act had gen-
erally been limited to abridgements of federally protected rights,
privileges and immunities by action of state officials pursuant to state
law.4 Screws held that conduct by state officials, even though in
*Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. The Author wishes to thank
William J. Crowell, Jr., Associate Editor of the DENVER LAW JOURNAL, for his research
assistance.
1365 U.S. 167 '(1961).
2 REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
A subsequent section provides a damages remedy for conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights. REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958). The
federal district courts have original jurisdiction over damage suits brought under §§
1983, 1985(3). 68 Stat. 1241 (1954), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958).
3 325 U.S. 91 '(1945).
4 See Alfange, Under Color of Law: Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNPL L T.Q
395 (1962); Shapo, Constitutional Tort.: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 282-87 (1965) ; Comment, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. lon-
roe, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 163-66 (1961).
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violation of state law, might nevertheless qualify as action "under
color of" state law, and subject state officials to criminal prosecution
under the act. In Monroe, the Court applied the holding in Screws
to section 1893, and extended the remedial reach of the act to tortious
conduct violative of an individual's civil rights and actionable under
state law.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, justified this du-
plication of remedies on the ground that "by reason of prejudice, pas-
sion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced, and the immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies."5 In a lengthy and forceful
dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that by not limiting the Civil
Rights Act to cases where redress in state courts had been barred by
state law or custom, the Court was upsetting the delicate balance vital
to a viable federal system.
Monroe has predictably' led to an increase in the number of civil
suits under the act.7 However, the reported decisions scarcely touch
upon the issue of the relationship between federal and state law in
the area where civil remedies overlap. This comment will refrain
from debate on the desirability of the overlap, and instead focus on
the challenge to federalism posed by its existence.
Damage suits under section 1983 have been based upon the com-
mission of such common law torts as assault and battery,' false arrest,'
false imprisonment," malicious prosecution," invasion of privacy, 2
and apparently, even negligence. 2 Since the constitutional tort and
the common law tort protect different interests even though they may
arise from the same occurrence, 4 plaintiff may maintain separate
suits in the state and federal court. Res judicata would seem clearly
inapplicable because of the distinct nature of the right which plaintiff
claims has been violated in each suit, but a specific finding of fact
5 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
61d. at 240:
One argument urged in Screws in favor of the result which that case reached
was the announced policy of self-restraint of the Department of Justice in
the prosecution of cases under 18 U.S.C. § 242. . . .Experience indicates that
private litigants cannot be expected to show the same consideration for the
autonomy of local administration which the Department purportedly shows.
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting.)
See also Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529, 530 (7th Cir. 1961).
7 See Shapo, supra note 4, at 325 n.249.
8 E.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
9 E.g., Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
10 E.g., Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1963).
11 Ibid.
12 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cr. 1963).
13 See Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (complaint which included
allegation of negligent or intentional failure to procure medical attention upheld).
14See Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).
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(for example, defendant did not commit a battery upon plaintiff)
made in the first suit may be binding in the second suit under the
principle of collateral estoppel. 5 In what appears to be the only
opinion considering the point, the Third Circuit assumed, without
deciding, that collateral estoppel would be available as a defense in a
suit under section 1983, and held that since the transcript of the prior
state-court action (plaintiff's conviction of assault and battery upon
two of the defendants) had not been admitted into evidence in the
federal suit, defendants could not invoke collateral estoppel to bar
plaintiff's claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act."
The paucity of authority on this issue suggests a strategic reluc-
tance on the part of plaintiffs to bring separate suits in state and fed-
eral courts. In confining themselves to the federal forum, plaintiffs
are faced with the question of whether they may join counts alleging
common law torts with their claim for relief under section 1983. If
diversity of citizenship exists and the prayer for damages seeks the
jurisdictional amount, joinder is of course permissible. 7 In the ab-
sence of diversity jurisdiction, the federal court may adjudicate the
state claim only if the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is applicable."'
The leading case delineating the scope of pendent jurisdiction is
Hurn v. Oursler.9 There the Supreme Court held that "where two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged,
only one of which presents a federal question ... where the federal
question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court,
even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless
retain and dispose of the case on the nonfederal ground .... o A
distinction is drawn between situations involving a single cause of
action based on both federal and nonfederal grounds and those in-
volving more than one cause of action, some of which are federal and
others of which are nonfederal. The Court will apply the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction to the former,2' but not the latter. Thus, in
Hurn the Court states that "the rule does not go so far as to permit a
federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-
15 See Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARv. L. REV. 513,
523-25 (1958).
16 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
17 See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1963).
18 See generally Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 VILL.
L. REV. 56 (1965) ; Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent T,,urs-
diction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962).
19 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
20 Id. at 246.
21 See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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federal cause of action because it is joined in the same complaint with
a federal cause of action."'
A complaint which alleges a common law assault and a violation
of section 1983 states two causes of action and seeks money damages
for two wrongs. On the other hand, the claims arise out of the same
occurrence and the elements of the state cause of action are included
among the elements of the federal cause of action.3
Where the federal claim is "plainly wanting in substance," the
courts have not hesitated to dismiss any nonfederal claim joined with
it."4 A suggested rationale for this result is that "the dog would be
wagged by his tail if plenary trial of an ancillary claim was compelled
by a primary claim which could be disposed of on the pleadings."2
Application of this rule may be found in several cases under the Civil
Rights Act, where courts have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction com-
plaints alleging an insubstantial claim of violation of section 1983
and the commission of a common law tort. 6
Yet these decisions do not concern themselves with the question
of whether a claim based on the commission of a common law tort
may be joined with a valid claim for relief under section 1983.3 One
answer is that the elements of damage recoverable under section 1983
substantially encompass those recoverable at common law, 8 and
therefore the issue of jurisdiction need never be reached. Thus,
22 289 U.S. at 246.
23 The presence of the elements of the common law tort among the elements of the con-
stitutional tort (see also note 36 infra), and the virtual identity of damages recover-
able under each tort (see note 28 infra and accompanying text), support the view that
pendent jurisdiction is really a discretionary device to promote judicial economy. It
has been suggested that the ultimate inquiry to be answered by the federal courts is
"has there been a substantial commitment of federal judicial resources to the nonfederal
claim at the time the federal claim is decided so that remittance of the nonfederal
claim to a state court would occasion a senseless duplication of judicial and litigant
effort?" Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1044 (1962).
24 E.g., Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
25 HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 808 (1953).
26 E.g., Vechiola v. City of Chicago, 244 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ; Rogers v. Provi-
dent Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
27 This issue seems to have been overlooked in at least one case involving a valid § 1983
claim and a tort claim based on state law. In Stringer v. Dilger, Civil No. 7073, D.
Colo., March 16, 1961, the common law claim made no allegation of jurisdiction. Id.,
Complaint, p. 4. The answer failed to raise lack of diversity of citizenship as a defense
(Id., Answer, pp. 2-3), although diversity was apparently lacking. In the pre-trial
order, jurisdiction was determined by the court and admitted by the parties. Record,
p. 8, Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
did not consider the jurisdiction issue. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir.
1963).
28 Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Here plaintiff attempted to uti-
lize the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to join a § 1983 claim with a claim alleging
the commission of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution at com-
mon law. The court found it unnecessary to rule on the common law claim because the




whether or not plaintiff adds a count alleging the commission of a
common law tort may make no practical difference in the outcome
of his case.
It is curious that the only case squarely raising the issue of
whether a tort claim under state law may be joined with a valid claim
of violation of the Civil Rights Act does not really involve the prob-
lem of overlapping damages because each count names a different
defendant. In Wojtas v. Niles, ' the Seventh Circuit affirmed a dis-
missal of common law claims against a municipal corporation on the
grounds that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, as enunciated in
Hurn, was inapplicable, and that there was no diversity of citizenship.
Defendants under the section 1983 claim were policemen employed
by the municipal corporation. The fact that the defendants were dif-
ferent under the federal and state claims would seem to be relevant
to a decision not to apply pendent jurisdiction, but the court makes
no mention of it. The opinion conveys the impression that common
law claims had not been brought against the policemen." If such
claims had been made, the issue would have been more clearly drawn,
and the language of the court suggests that they would have been
dismissed on the same grounds.
Though section 1983 says nothing about money damages, the
courts have interpreted it to provide a remedy enabling plaintiff to
obtain monetary relief.31 Punitive damages, intended to punish de-
fendant and deter him from subsequent misconduct,32 are clearly re-
coverable.3 Under the general rule that plaintiff may obtain dam-
ages proximately resulting from the commission of a tort,34 it would
seem that compensatory damages caused by injury stemming from a
violation of section 1983 should also be recoverable. In support of
this proposition is Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in his majority
opinion in Monroe that "Section [1983] should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions.'""
Common law tort damages may also be both compensatory and
punitive. The pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss which results from
the commission of the common law tort will also result from the
- 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1964).
30 A claim under § 1983 had not been brought against defendant-village because the
Civil Rights Act has been held not to create a damages remedy against a municipal
corporation. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31 See generally Shapo, supra note 4; Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Pro-
ec,ion of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839, 846-47 (1964).
32 
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
33 E.g., Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
34 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 32, ch. 9.
35 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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commission of the constitutional tort, so that the compensatory ele-
ment will exactly overlap with the compensatory damages recover-
able under section 1983.36 The punitive element seeks to punish de-
fendant, but only for the infringement of plaintiff's rights as pro-
tected by common law. However, since this infringement is in effect
a part of the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, it would
seem that a jury might take both wrongs into account in awarding
punitive damages under section 1983."7 The only elements of damage
recoverable under federal law but not under state law would be puni-
tive damages directed solely at punishing the commission of the con-
stitutional tort, and perhaps damages for mental suffering related to
the constitutional infringement only.
The substantial identity of the damages recoverable at common
law and under the Civil Rights Act creates further complications
when the question of choice of damage law is considered. Though
section 1983 is silent on this point, section 1988 provides that where
federal law is insufficient to furnish a proper remedy,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court ... is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause .... 18
The Third Circuit has broadly interpreted this provision in a
dictum in Basista v. Weir.9 The court stated that an award of puni-
tive damages in a civil-rights action brought in Pennsylvania would
be governed by federal common law, which allows recovery of puni-
tive damages in a civil rights action brought in Pennsylvania would
by Pennsylvania law, which requires proof of actual harm before
punitive damages may be awarded. The need for uniformity in the
application of a federal statute was postulated as the basis for this
position. To apply state law, the court declared, "would be to create
a legal hybrid of an incredible and unworkable kind.""
It is submitted that the court's language is too broad. A decision
to use the federal law of punitive damages in a particular case might
S But see The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 40, 215 (1961): "Since
1983 recovery is necessarily limited to conduct in violation of federal law, any torts
not so violative commited in the course of the misconduct giving rise to the federal right
cannot be compensated under section 1983 and are therefore separately actionable
under state law."
The difficulty with this statement is that it fails to differentiate between a tort and
the damages recovarebl as a result of it. And quaere whether the common law tort is
not in effect a "lesser included offense" within the reach of the constitutional tort.
37 Of course, if separate actions are brought in state and federal court, or if § 1983 and
common law claims are made in federal court, plaintiff will not be permitted to recover
double damages. See, e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
38 
REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958).
39 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
40 Id. at 87.
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better be based upon the desirability of circumventing a restrictive
state rule which is inconsistent with the policy of section 1983, the
result being punishment of those who abridge constitutionally pro-
tected rights under color of state law. The punitive damages sought
in Basista were aimed at a violation of plaintiff's federally created
rights and could not be recovered under state law. Therefore, the
federal substantive law of damages was properly chosen, even though
the court's sole reliance on the need for uniformity is questionable.
The exclusive use of federal damage law under the Civil Rights Act
would lead to the disparity feared by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Monroe, where he asked: "Should an unlawful intrusion
by a policeman in Chicago entail different consequences than an un-
lawful intrusion by a hoodlum?"'"
It follows, then, that a federal court may apply state law in de-
termining questions of damage law which relate to damages also re-
coverable under state law. While section 1988 may be cited to justify
this "borrowing,"4 the overlap itself provides a more appropriate
basis for supporting the use of state law. If the same elements of
damage may be recovered under federal and state law, consistency in
principles of substantive damage law makes the existing duplication
of remedy somewhat less disruptive. If federal law is to be exclu-
sively applied, the purpose, as stated by the court in Basista, would
be to ensure uniformity in the application of a federal statute. A fed-
eral law of personal injury damages may be gleaned from decisions
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act " or the Jones Act.44 Yet
it is doubtful whether even among these decisions uniformity will al-
ways be found."
Another aspect of the choice-of-law problem arises upon the
death of a party to an action under section 1983. Two distinct issues
are involved: (1) should the action survive? (2) if so, what law
should be applied? Where the original defendant has died, federal
common law provides that penal actions are extinguished, but reme-
41 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 239 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
42 But see Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
290, 294-97 (1963) (argument that § 1988 was intended to apply to forms of process
and remedy only).
43 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60'(1952) (remedy for railroad em-
ployees for injuries sustained because of negligence of employers). See also DeParcq
& Wright, Damages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 17 OHIO ST. L.J.
430 (1956).
4441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (remedy for seamen for injuries sus-
tained because of negligence of employers).
45 See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 802 (2d Cir. 1961) (split
among federal courts of appeal on question whether exercise of discretion by trial
judge in refusing to set aside verdict for excessiveness may be reviewed).
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dial suits survive. " Since an action under section 1983 seeking puni-
tive and compensatory damages is both penal and remedial, it is
plausible to conclude that at least that part of the claim seeking com-
pensatory damages will survive the death of the tortfeasor under
federal common law. Thus, the Eighth Circuit in Pritchard v. Smith"
unnecessarily looked to state law and used the Arkansas survival
statute to preserve plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages.
The aggrieved party may die, either as a result of the violation
of his civil rights or from independent causes. An example of the
latter is Nelson v. Knox,48 an action under the Civil Rights Act for
destruction of decedent's business. The court, drawing on the com-
mon law rule that tort actions based on interference with property
rights survive, allowed decedent's estate to bring the action. It has
already been pointed out that federal common law permits remedial
actions to survive.49 Therefore when decedent dies from causes un-
related to the deprivation of his civil rights, his estate should be able
to recover the compensatory damages which decedent could have ob-
tained had he lived.
Where death results from the constitutional tort, the anomaly of
relieving from liability the wrongdoer who brings about the ultimate
liquidation of his victim's civil rights is a strong policy argument for
the recognition of a death action under section 1983. While it may
be argued that a subsequent section of the act providing for the sur-
vival of actions based upon the intentional failure or refusal to pre-
vent a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights which results in death"0
indicates a Congressional intent not to permit death actions under
section 1983, this contention was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Brazier v. Cherry.5 The court stated that the details of the statute
would be construed according to the total, overriding purpose of the
act. The opinion in Brazier also points to section 1988 as authorizing
46 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
290, 300-03 (1963) ; see also Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), recognizing that an action under the federal securities act is both
penal and remedial, but characterizing it as remedial to allow the action to survive the
death of the tortfeasor and thus fulfil the policy of the act to recompense defrauded
purchasers.
47289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); see Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1962).
48230 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1956); cf. Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961) (refusal to enjoin execution of prisoner, even though lat-
ter had initiated damage suit under § 1983 against penitentiary guards; court assumes
without deciding that action under Civil Rights Act would abate on prisoner's execu-
tion).
49 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 290,
300-03 (1963).
50 REV. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958) (recovery limited to $5,000).
51293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961) ; Comment, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 386 (1962); Comment, 40 TExAs L. Rav. 1050 (1962); Comment, 47 VA. L.
REV. 1241 (1961); Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1962).
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resort to state law in order to create a remedy for death, although it
has been suggested that if Congress intended such a remedy to be
available, its existence should not depend on state law. 2
The difference between a survival statute and a wrongful death
statute is that the former permits recovery of damages sustained by
decedent until the time of his death, while the latter creates a remedy
for damages resulting from his death.' This distinction supports the
solution reached in Davis v. Johnson,"' which allowed a death action
to be brought under section 1983 by construing the words "party in-
jured" to include the administratrix of decedent's estate.
On balance, the conclusion that death actions may be brought
under section 1983 seems fully justifiable. The issue of choice of
law must next be faced. In Brazier, the Fifth Circuit used the Georgia
death statute. Resort to state law is supported by the analogy to ad-
miralty cases, where the federal courts have applied state death stat-
utes to furnish a remedy unavailable under admiralty law. Further-
more, it is well settled that state statutes of limitations are applicable
in damage suits under the Civil Rights Act.5 On the other hand,
whether punitive damages survive, where the death is from violation
of section 1983 or from independent causes, should be a matter of
federal law, since such damages specifically punish the constitutional
infringement.57
The suggestion that the federal courts may resort to state law in
assessing compensatory damages for injury or death resulting from a
violation of the Civil Rights Act leads to a further, more difficult
question: namely, must they do so where the state law imposes un-
desirable limitations? Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe
poses the possibility of a state's passing legislation which eliminates
pain and suffering as elements of damage.58 A more realistic even-
tuality is the death of a man who would contribute to his survivors
much more than the maximum limit placed by state law upon wrong-
ful-death recoveries.5" In an action under section 1983, if a federal
52 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
290, 297 (1963).
53 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 32, § 93.
54 138 F. Supp. 572 '(N.D. Il. 1955).
55 See Comments, State Wrongful Death Acts and Maritime Torts, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 643
(1961) ; The Application of State Survival Statutes in Maritime Cases, 60 COLuM. L.
REV. 534 (1960).
5 6 See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1964).
57 See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). Under federal law, it appears that
punitive damages do not survive. See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal
Statute, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 290, 300-03 (1963).
5 8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 239 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
59 The use of the Civil Rights Act as a device to circumvent the $25,000 limitation on
the Colorado death statute is suggested in 13 Trial Talk, Colo. Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
No. 5, p. 2, Law Day 1966.
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court may use state law in these instances, what standards should be
used to determine when the court may not use state law, and resort
to principles such as federal common law is authorized?
In support of a selective use of state law is the view that a fed-
erally protected right should not be subjected to substantial under-
mining by state law. Thus, when use of state law would in effect
deprive plaintiff of a remedy under section 1983, the federal courts
should ignore state law." It is doubtful whether a maximum wrong-
ful-death dollar limit or the elimination of pain and suffering as ele-
ments of damage would substantially destroy the remedy provided
under section 1983. On the other hand, the use of the strict pecuniary
loss theory in a death case "1 involving an aged person whose demise
causes no monetary loss to his survivors might be considered as so
repugnant to the purpose of the federal statute that a departure from
state law would be justifiable. This approach bestows upon the fed-
eral courts a certain flexibility devoid of precision but better adapted
to the intent of the Civil Rights Act.
The argument against selective use is that it further complicates
the "legal hybrid" created by the application of federal and state law
to various elements of damage recoverable under the act. In other
words, both federal and state law are utilized, but for that portion of
the cause of action to which state law is ordinarily applicable, the
court may decide to substitute, in part, federal law.
By this time, it should be obvious that the disclaimer at the be-
ginning of this comment regarding discussion of the desirability of
the state-federal overlap has not been strictly followed. The entangle-
ments caused by the overlap indeed reflect in some way upon its de-
sirability. While predictions that the overlap will destroy the federal
system seem overdrawn, the conceptual difficulties inherent in its
existence should not be underestimated, even though they have up to
now been largely neglected by the courts.
Nonetheless, these complexities do not seem capable of counter-
balancing the need for a federal damages remedy under the Civil
Rights Act. The duplication of remedies has not yet destroyed the
delicate balance between state and federal government. After all,
federalism is not an abstract ideal to be revered for its logical purity,
but a relational structure designed to serve a nation's needs. As these
needs shift, creative adjustments in the system are unavoidable.
60 CI. Cinnamon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (plaintiff
died during pendency of private antitrust suit under Clayton Act; defendant argued that
since federal act made no mention of survivability, the court should apply state law,
under which the action would abate; held, since state law might defeat the policy of the
federal act, federal decisional law, which allowed survival of the action, would govern).
61 See Page, "Pecuniary' Damages for Wrongful Death, 7 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 398
(1963).
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